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"WHATEVER IS RECEIVED": EVALUATING COLLATERAL,
ITS DISPOSITION, AND PROCEEDS UNDER ARTICLE 9 OF
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE--Rainier National Bank
v. Bachmann, 111 Wash. 2d 298, 757 P.2d 979 (1988).
Abstract: In Rainier National Bank v. Bachmann, the Washington Supreme Court held
that payments made to a debtor under the federal Dairy Termination Program were "pro-
ceeds" of the collateral at issue in the case under the Uniform Commercial Code
("UCC"). The author examines the relationship between proceeds and the collateral
described by parties to a security agreement, concludes that the court improperly applied
the UCC in Bachmann, and recommends an approach to evaluating proceeds.
A lender's security interest in collateral includes the proceeds
received by the debtor upon disposition of the collateral under Uni-
form Commercial Code ("UCC") § 9-306.1 The need for a security
interest in "proceeds" of collateral stems from the danger that a
secured lender may have no security if its interest in collateral is lost
when the debtor sells or otherwise disposes of the collateral.2 In a
normal sale of collateral, the lender's security interest attaches to the
proceeds of its sale. However, some transactions do not resemble a
normal sale.
In Rainier National Bank v. Bachmann, 3 the Washington Supreme
Court considered whether payments made to dairy farmers by the fed-
eral government under the Dairy Termination Program ("DTP") 4
were "proceeds" of the bank's security interest in a borrower's dairy
cattle under Washington's version of UCC § 9-306(l).1 The court
held, in a five-to-four decision, that the entire payment made to elimi-
nate the farmers from the dairy business was proceeds of cattle, the
collateral stated in the security agreement.
In unusual cases, such as Bachmann, the limits of what constitutes
proceeds are not intuitive. A useful approach to the problem, how-
ever, can be gleaned from the purposes and policies of the UCC, and
I. Proceeds are defined as "[w]hatever is received upon the sale, exchange, collection or other
disposition of collateral or proceeds." U.C.C. § 9-306(1) (1987).
2. See id. §§ 9-306(2), 9-307, 9-308, 9-309. These sections provide that some purchasers take
collateral free of a secured party's perfected security interest.
3. Ill Wash. 2d 298, 757 P.2d 979 (1988).
4. The DTP was created by the Food Security Act of 1985, 7 U.S.C. § 1446(d)(3)(A)(i)-(d)(7)
(Supp. IV 1986). Implementing regulations appear at 7 C.F.R. §§ 1430.450-.470 (1988).
5. 111 Wash. 2d at 308, 757 P.2d at 985 (applying WASH. REv. CODE § 62A.9-306(l)
(1987)). Although there is one difference between the official version of the Uniform Commercial
Code ("UCC") and the version enacted in Washington, contained in § 9-306(3)(b), this difference
is not important here. References to the UCC will hereinafter be to the 1972 revision of Article
9, contained in the 1987 Official Text of the UCC, except where noted.
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from cases in which courts have struggled with the limits of proceeds.
This analytical approach focuses on the collateral that parties contract
to encumber through a security agreement, and the relationship of the
collateral through its "disposition" to the money or goods received by
the debtor and claimed by the secured party as proceeds.
Applied to the facts of Bachmann, this analysis reveals that the
court went too far in granting Rainier Bank an interest in the entire
DTP amount. The cattle were disposed of by the debtors in Bach-
mann, but their proceeds were not the entire DTP amount. Rather,
the secured lender had an interest in the DTP payments as proceeds
only to the extent the payments reflected the value of the cattle, the
stated collateral in the security agreement. This conclusion would
have better promoted the UCC's purposes and policies of uniformity
and expansion of commercial lending practices.
I. PROCEEDS UNDER ARTICLE 9 OF THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE
A. Article 9 Security Interests and "Proceeds"
Article 9 of the UCC governs security interests in personal property.
In a secured loan transaction, a debtor receives money and grants an
interest in personal property to the creditor as collateral. Where the
collateral remains in the debtor's hands, a written security agreement
must be signed by the borrower.6 The security agreement must rea-
snably identify the collateral encumbered.'
The UCC offers protection to creditors when debtors dispose of col-
lateral. Creditors may follow collateral to its new owner if the debtor
parts with it.8 The creditor also has a right to any proceeds received
by the debtor upon disposition of the collateral.9 "Proceeds" are
defined as "whatever is received upon the sale exchange, collection, or
other disposition of collateral or proceeds."' They are typically the
6. U.C.C. § 9-203 (1987). Beyond the written security agreement, in order for a security
interest to become enforceable against the debtor, or "attach," the lender must have given
"value" (e.g., loan money), and the debtor must have "rights in the collateral." Id. §§ 9-203(2),
9-203(l)(a) & (b). One of the purposes of the security agreement is evidentiary. It "minimizes
the possibility of future dispute . . as to what property stands as collateral for the obligation
secured." Id. § 9-203 official comment 3.
7. Id. § 9-110.
8. Id. § 9-306(2).
9. Id.
10. Id. § 9-306(1). Generally, a right to the proceeds of collateral is presumed without the
word "proceeds" appearing in the security agreement or financing statement. Id. But see id. § 9-
306(3) (after ten days security interest in proceeds becomes unperfected in certain cases).
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money received when collateral is sold by a debtor. However, pro-
ceeds under section 9-306(1) may include items received other than
cash," from transactions other than sales. For example, the UCC
expressly provides that the definition of proceeds includes insurance
payments made upon loss or damage to collateral. 2
B. Judicial Rendering of "Other Disposition" and "Proceeds"
The limits of what may be an "other disposition" under UCC § 9-
306(1) are broad. For example, courts have found court awards of
"accounts and contract rights" 13 and the cancellation of debt'4 to be
dispositions under section 9-306(1). Moreover, the proceeds of a dis-
position can come from more than one source. The return by the gov-
ernment of customs duties paid by an importer of goods upon the final
export of a finished product was proceeds because the export itself was
a disposition." Transportation costs forwarded by a company hired
to ship strawberries were proceeds of the strawberries when transpor-
tation was a disposition of the collateral. 6 In these cases, the source
of proceeds was both the sale price of the collateral and the customs
duties or forwarded transportation costs.
Courts have imposed limits, however, on what constitutes an "other
disposition" and thus what constitutes proceeds under section 9-
306(1). The connection between the original collateral and the pro-
ceeds claimed may be too distant for the amount to be considered a
product of a "sale, exchange, collection or other disposition" of the
collateral. In order to be proceeds, what is received must actually be a
product of the disposition of the collateral, and not from some other
11. E.g., United States v. Handy and Harman, 750 F.2d 777, 785 (9th Cir. 1984) (accounts);
Security Say. Bank v. United States, 440 F. Supp. 444, 446 (S.D. Iowa 1977) (goods traded for
the original collateral); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Exchange Bank & Trust Co., 251 Ark. 881,
476 S.W.2d 208, 211 (1972) (chattel paper); see 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN
PERSONAL PROPERTY § 27.4, at 732-36 (1965). Furthermore, non-negotiable instruments or
general intangibles may be proceeds. See id. at 735 n.4. Although Gilmore viewed the
hypothetical appearance of non-negotiable instruments or general intangibles as proceeds as
"unlikely," id., they have been found to be proceeds. See, e.g., Osteroos v. Norwest Bank Minot,
N.A., 604 F. Supp. 848, 849 (D.N.D. 1984) (general intangible); Webster City Prod. Credit Ass'n
v. G.O. Implement, Inc., 3 10 N.W.2d 541, 542 (Iowa Ct. App. 198 1) (non-negotiable document).
12. U.C.C. § 9-306(1) (1987).
13. Effective Communications West, Inc. v. Board of Coop. Educ. Servs., 84 A.D.2d 941,446
N.Y.S.2d 684, 685 (1981).
14. Dixie Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Kent, 167 Ga. App. 714, 307 S.E.2d 277, 278 (1983).
15. Hercules, Inc. v. General Magnetic Tape Co., 180 N.J. Super. 206, 434 A.2d 636, 638
(1981).
16. Johanson Transp. Serv. v. Jimmy Grizzard Sales, Inc., 164 Cal. App. 3d 583, 210 Cal
Rptr. 433, 438 (1985).
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source.' 7 For example, the ingestion and digestion of grain by live-
stock was not a disposition of grain, so the livestock was not proceeds
of the grain.' 8 The transfer of corporate ownership of equipment,
when the corporations involved were owned by the same people, was
also not a disposition under section 9-306(l).' 9 Simply because there
has been action affecting the collateral does not mean that section 9-
306 has been triggered. One must look closely at the transaction
involved.2°
C. The Payment-in-Kind Program and Proceeds
Tension between a broad conception of proceeds that liberally con-
strues "other disposition" in section 9-306(1) and a more limited con-
ception of proceeds is seen in the numerous proceeds cases involving
the payment-in-kind ("PIK")2 agricultural subsidy program.22 The
PIK program, like many agricultural programs, was designed to limit
the market supply of certain crops.23 In the program, a farmer agreed
not to plant a crop or destroyed a growing crop, and received an in-
kind payment of that crop in return. The farmer was then free to sell
this in-kind payment through usual channels.
17. Seaman v. Clearwater Oaks Bank, 469 So. 2d 246, 247 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); C.O.
Funk & Son, Inc. v. Sullivan Equip., Inc., 92 Ill. App. 3d 659, 415 N.E.2d 1308, 1312 (1981),
aff'd, 89 Il1. 2d 27, 431 N.E.2d 370 (1982).
18. First Nat'l Bank of Brush v. Bostron, 39 Colo. App. 107, 564 P.2d 964, 966 (1977);
Farmers Coop. Elevator Co. v. Union State Bank, 409 N.W.2d 178, 180 (Iowa 1987).
19. In re Kittyhawk Television Corp., 516 F.2d 24, 26 (6th Cir. 1975).
20. See Mechanics Nat'l Bank of Worcester v. Gaucher, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 143, 386 N.E.2d
1052, 1055 (1979) (when a down payment was made on a mobile home but the purchaser died
and the home was never delivered, there was no "disposition" of the home and thus no proceeds);
Realty Growth Investors v. Commercial & Indus. Bank of Memphis, 370 So. 2d 297, 302 (Ala.
Civ. App.), cert. denied, 370 So. 2d 306 (Ala. 1979) (a bank with a security interest in the
debtor's check under Article 4 of the UCC received no proceeds because the check was
dishonored and thus there was no disposition of the collateral).
21. 7 C.F.R. §§ 770.1-770.6 (1984); id. §§ 770.1-770.7 (1985); id. §§ 770.1-770.7 (1986).
The legislative authority for the payment-in-kind ("PIK") program was the Agricultural Act of
1949, Pub. L. No. 81-439, 63 Stat. 1051 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1444, 1444d,
1445b-l (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)) and the Commodity Credit Corporation Charter Act, 62 Stat.
1070, Pub. L. No. 80-806 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 714 (1982)). A less comprehensive
payment-in-kind program still exists, providing that crops may be substituted for direct cash
payments or other credits granted farmers through other subsidy programs. 7 C.F.R. § 770.5
(1988).
22. See generally Marsh, Are PIK Payments "Proceeds" Under Article 9? 7 J. AGRIc. TAX'N
& L. 291, 296-311 (1986); Rasor & Wadley, The Secured Farm Creditor's Interest in Federal
Price Supports: Policies and Priorities. 73 Ky. L.J. 595, 649-57 (1985); Comment, Bankruptcy,
the U. C.C., and the Farmer: PIK Payments-Heads "General Intangibles, " Tails "Proceeds. " 26
WASHBURN L.J. 178, 183-94 (1986).
23. See Rasor & Wadley, supra note 22, at 606.
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A majority of courts have found that PIK payments, if no crop was
grown, were not proceeds of crops named as collateral in security
agreements.24 Because there was no collateral to dispose of, no secur-
ity interest attached to the PIK payments.2 5 These courts have rea-
soned that subsidy programs in agriculture have been in existence for
many years, so lenders should describe their intended collateral com-
pletely if they desire an interest in PIK payments.2 6 Careful drafting
is the proper solution for secured parties.2 7
These decisions in cases in which no crops were grown imply that
PIK payments are proceeds when crops have been grown, because the
collateral described in the security agreement exists and is capable of
being "disposed of."'28 Some courts have explicitly made this crops-no
crops distinction.2 9 Thus, in the PIK cases, courts have examined the
collateral at issue, and its relation to the PIK payments claimed as
proceeds.
D. The Dairy Termination Program and Proceeds
The Dairy Termination Program,3" like other agricultural subsidy
programs, is intended to stabilize commodity prices and promote the
livelihood of farmers.3" The goal of the DTP is to reduce the market
supply of milk by permanently reducing the number of producers.32
In the program, dairy farmers receive payments based on the value of
their milk production business, calculated by each farmer in a bid sub-
mitted to the Commodity Credit Corporation.33 After a bid is
24. See, eg., In re George, 85 Bankr. 133, 144 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1988); In re Clark, 82 Bankr.
131, 133 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1987). Courts that have held PIK payments to be proceeds when no
crop was grown have reasoned that they are a substitute for the crops that farmers would have
grown if they never entered the program. See, e.g., In re Cupp, 38 Bankr. 953, 955 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 1984); Production Credit Ass'n of Fairmont v. Martin County Nat'l Bank of Fairmont, 384
N.W.2d 529, 531-32 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
25. E.g., In re Schmaling, 783 F.2d 680, 683 (7th Cir. 1986).
26. Id. at 683-84.
27. Id. at 684; accord Marsh, supra note 22, at 312.
28. See, eg., In re Clark, 82 Bankr. 131, 133 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1987).
29. Id.; In re George, 85 Bankr. 133, 146 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1988); In re Mattick, 45 Bankr.
615, 617 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985); In re Kruse, 35 Bankr. 958, 965-66 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983);
accord In re Kruger, 78 Bankr. 538, 541 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1987) (in order for payments from
another subsidy program to be proceeds, a crop must be grown).
30. 7 C.F.R. §§ 1430.450-.470 (1988); see supra note 4.
31. See generally Rasor & Wadley, supra note 22, at 610-24.
32. 7 C.F.R. § 1430.450 (1988); see H.R. REP. No. 271, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 reprinted in
1985 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1103, 1125.
33. 7 C.F.R. § 1430.456 (1988). The bid equals the product of a proposed dollar amount per
hundredweight of milk and the farmers' contract base. Id. The contract base is the quantity of
milk marketed for commercial use during one of two twelve-month periods, subject to
adjustments related to time of ownership of the cattle by producers participating in each bid. Id.
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accepted, farmers receive DTP payments if they sell all their dairy
cattle for slaughter or export from the United States,34 and agree to
relinquish any ownership interest in dairy cattle or the production of
milk for five years.35
In the decisions handed down before Bachmann, courts found either
that the DTP payments are not proceeds of cattle or are proceeds of
non-cattle property.36  In these cases, the courts examined the lan-
guage of each creditor's security agreement. Where the security agree-
ments claimed "general intangibles" or "contract rights" as original
collateral, the creditor received the entire DTP amount.37  However,
where the parties did not agree to include the assets of the ongoing
business or use language such as "general intangibles" or "contract
rights," the creditors could not reach the payments as proceeds of cat-
tle.38  These cases demonstrate the importance of the relationship
between what is claimed as original collateral in a security agreement
and what is claimed to be proceeds of that collateral. 39  For example,
§ 1430.455. If the bid is accepted, a contract is signed, id. § 1430.456(c), which entitles a
participating producer to receive the amount of the bid by one of two payment schedules spread
over five years. Id. § 1430.459(a), 1430.459(f). The money promised by the government cannot
be paid until it is determined that the farmer has complied with the requirements of the program.
Id. § 1430.459. In each of the five years of the DTP contract, farmers must certify to officials
that they are complying by not owning dairy cattle or production facilities. Id. § 1430.459(g).
There are penalties for non-compliance or fraud, including refund of the DTP payments. Id.
§ 1430.462.
34. Id. § 1430.457. Farmers must sell their cattle before the end of a period stated in their
contract with the government. Id.
35. Id. § 1430.457(b).
36. In re Hofstee, 88 Bankr. 308, 310-11, modified by addendum at 312 (Bankr. E.D. Wash.
1988) (payments were proceeds of the debtors' business "goodwill," a general intangible covered
by the security agreement); FMB-First Mich. Bank v. Van Rhee, 681 F. Supp. 1264, 1268 (W.D.
Mich. 1987) (payments were proceeds of "the specific property [including livestock], together
with all related rights" (emphasis by court)); Lisbon Bank & Trust Co. v. Commodity Credit
Corp., 679 F. Supp. 903, 905 (N.D. Iowa 1987) (payments were not proceeds of cattle); Bank of
North Ark. v. Owens, 76 Bankr. 672, 674 (E.D. Ark. 1987) (payments were not proceeds of
cattle); In re Grunzke, 68 Bankr. 446, 449 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987) (payments were not proceeds
of cattle); In re Weyland, 63 Bankr. 854, 858-59 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1986) (payments were not
proceeds of cattle, but were "general intangibles"); see In re Collins, 68 Bankr. 242, 243 (Bankr.
D. Minn. 1986) (issue whether payments were proceeds not reached because "general
intangibles" described in the security agreement); see also In re Bowling, 64 Bankr. 710, 713
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1986) (a security interest in dairy cattle entitled creditor to lien on DTP
payments up to market value of the cattle).
37. Van Rhee, 681 F. Supp. at 1267 (general intangibles); Lisbon, 679 F. Supp. at 906
(contract rights); Collins, 68 Bankr. at 243.
38. Owens, 76 Bankr. at 674; Weyland, 63 Bankr. at 859; see Van Rhee, 681 F. Supp. at 1268
(the language of the parties' security agreement encumbered the debtors' dairy business).
39. A noteworthy case applying this principle in detail is In re Hofstee, 88 Bankr. 308 (Bankr.
E.D. Wash. 1988). Hofstee, a Washington bankruptcy case, was originally decided before
Bachmann. In Hofstee, the debtors entered into a DTP contract after filing for bankruptcy. The
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in a case where the parties merely listed as collateral in their security
agreement cattle, farm equipment, and all property which "result[ed]"
from these items,' the DTP payments were not the proceeds of any-
thing that had been agreed upon as collateral.41 The DTP payments
stemmed from an agreement to get out of the dairy business, some-
thing not contracted for as security.42 Similarly, other courts have
found part of the payments to be proceeds of either the farmers' busi-
nesses4 3 or promises to get out of the dairy business.'
On the other hand, several courts have implied that DTP payments
may be proceeds of cattle to the extent they are compensation for cat-
tle.45 These courts examined the components of the claimed proceeds
amount, and gave the lender either the difference between slaughter
value and market value,46 or the component of the DTP payments
equalling the cattle's market value.4 7
court was required to determine who had an interest in the payments in considering the debtors'
reorganization plan that covered these payments. IMl at 309. In the court's initial decision, it
held that DTP payments were based primarily on the goodwill value of the debtors' business and
the value of their personal covenant to forego their vocation. Id. at 310-11. Therefore, the
portion attributable to goodwill, a general intangible covered by the parties' security agreement,
could be claimed as proceeds of the agreed collateral, but the portion related to the covenant
could not. Id. at 311.
After the Bachmann decision, the court revised its holding. In an addendum to the original
opinion, it interpreted the decision to mean that the entire DTP amount was "proceeds" of the
debtors' cattle. Id. at 312. However, the court continued to hold that some of the DTP money
had its source in the debtors' covenant to forego ownership in a dairy operation and was not the
amount that would have been received by the creditor if the debtors had disposed of their cattle
outside the program. The court based its stance on its equitable powers under bankruptcy law.
Id. at 313-14; see 11 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1982).
40. Owens, 76 Bankr. at 673.
41. Id. at 674.
42. Id.
43. FMB-First Mich. Bank v. Van Rhee, 681 F. Supp. 1264, 1268 (W.D. Mich. 1987); In re
Grunzke, 68 Bankr. 446, 449 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987).
44. Lisbon Bank & Trust Co. v. Commodity Credit Corp., 679 F. Supp. 903, 905 (N.D. Iowa
1987).
45. Van Rhee, 681 F. Supp. at 1268; In re Hofstee, 88 Bankr. 308, 310, 312 (Bankr. E.D.
Wash. 1988); Grunzke, 68 Bankr. at 449; In re Bowling, 64 Bankr. 710, 713 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
1986).
46. Van Rhee, 681 F. Supp. at 1268; Grunzke, 68 Bankr. at 449. Of course, the lender also
received the proceeds of the sale of the cattle for slaughter.
47. Hofstee, 88 Bankr. at 310, 312 (the creditor was entitled to the market value rather than
the auction slaughter value of the cattle, and therefore the portion of the DTP payments
attributable to the cattle's market value was property of the debtors' estate under Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code); see I1 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (defining property of the
estate).
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II. RAINIER NATIONAL BANK V BACHMANN
The Washington Supreme Court in Bachmann held that Rainier
Bank had a security interest in DTP subsidy payments received by the
Bachmanns, the bank's debtors.48 The security agreement at issue
granted the bank an interest in the Bachmanns' dairy livestock, dairy
equipment, and farm products, and "[a]ll proceeds and products of the
foregoing."49 The Bachmanns' bid to enter the DTP program was
accepted, and as required by the DTP, the Bachmanns sold all of their
dairy cattle for slaughter.5" They received both the proceeds from the
auction of the cattle5' and the right to payments from the govern-
ment.52 Upon default by the debtors, the bank claimed an interest in
both amounts, but the debtors assigned only the slaughter value of the
cattle to the bank and attempted to assign the DTP payments to other
creditors.53
The issue in the Bachmann case was whether the bank had a secur-
ity interest in the DTP payments as proceeds of cattle and their prod-
ucts.5 4 This required the court to determine whether there had been
an "other disposition" of the bank's collateral when the Bachmanns
entered the DTP under the Washington version of the UCC.55
The Bachmann court, in a majority opinion by Justice
Brachtenbach, found that the DTP payments were proceeds under
section 9-306. The court began its analysis by stating that the defini-
tion of proceeds is to be construed liberally,56 noting that its analysis
would be made in "the factual context presented."'57 According to the
court, the statutory definition of proceeds is binding upon the parties
48. Rainier Nat'l Bank v. Bachmann, 111 Wash. 2d 298, 299, 757 P.2d 979, 980 (1988). The
court reversed summary judgment granted by the trial court denying Rainier Bank's claim that
the DTP payments were subject to its personal property security interests. Id.
49. Id. at 300, 757 P.2d at 980.
50. Id., 757 P.2d at 981.
51. Id. at 301, 757 P.2d at 981.
52. Id. at 300, 757 P.2d at 981.
53. Id. at 301, 757 P.2d at 981.
54. Id. at 302, 757 P.2d at 982. The bank's arguments 'focuse[d] solely on its security
interest in the dairy cattle and their proceeds." Id. Thus the court did not reach the issue
whether the payments were "accounts," the collateral listed in another of the bank's security
agreements with the Bachmanns, id. at 301, 757 P.2d at 981, nor did it examine whether
"equipment" or "farm products" covered in the same security agreement as the cattle affected
the bank's interest in the DTP payments.
55. WASH. REV. CODE § 62A.9-306(l) (1987). This subsection of the Washington statute is
identical to U.C.C. § 9-306(1) (1987).
56. Bachmann, 111 Wash. 2d at 302, 757 P.2d at 981 (citing In re Munger, 495 F.2d 511, 513
(9th Cir. 1974) ("proceeds" should be given a "flexible and broad content")).
57. Id., 757 P.2d at 981.
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to a security agreement.58 The court found that an "other disposition"
encompasses transactions other than sales,59 including situations
where money is received from someone other than a buyer. The cattle,
the bank's collateral, were disposed of when the farmer entered the
DTP. Because proceeds are defined as "whatever is received" from a
disposition of collateral,6" the bank's security interest extended to
DTP payments.61
The court characterized the entirety of the bank's security inter-
ests62 as involving the Bachmanns' total dairy operation. It concluded
that the parties contemplated that more than just the individual cows
would serve as collateral.63 The bank's interests therefore attached to
the business as a whole, rather than to specific pieces of property. The
security agreement at issue in the Bachmann case included collateral
that was the income source of the business, the dairy cattle.' Enter-
ing the DTP compensated the Bachmanns for more than the cattle's
slaughter value; it also compensated for the value of the ongoing milk-
production business.65 As a result, the DTP payments, corresponding
to predicted future business revenues, were proceeds of the
collateral.66
The court also considered the parties' intent, finding that the parties
intended when they contracted that DTP payments would be "pro-
ceeds" of the collateral.67 After construing the words "other disposi-
tion" to include transactions other than sales, the court stated that if
the parties intended proceeds to be solely money received from a Sale
of the collateral, their agreement would have expressly limited pro-
ceeds to those received from sale.68 The court assumed that agricul-
tural security agreements are drafted with agricultural subsidy
58. Id., 757 P.2d at 982.
59. Id. at 303, 757 P.2d at 982.
60. Id. at 302, 757 P.2d at 982.
61. Id. at 308, 757 P.2d at 985.
62. Rainier Bank had three security agreements. The first agreement encumbered '"[a]ll
Accounts (rights to payment for goods sold or leased or for services rendered) of Borrower now
existing or hereafter acquired'" and "'[a]ll proceeds of the foregoing.'" Id. at 299, 757 P.2d at
980. The second security agreement was the one at issue in Bachmann. See supra note 54 and
accompanying text. The third agreement covered beef cattle and proceeds. Bachmann, lll
Wash. 2d at 299-300, 757 P.2d at 980.
63. Bachmann, 111 Wash. 2d at 302, 757 P.2d at 981-82.
64. Id., 757 P.2d at 982.
65. Id. at 303, 757 P.2d at 982.
66. Id. at 305, 757 P.2d at 983 (citing In re Cupp, 38 Bankr. 953, 956 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1984)).
67. Id. at 302-03, 757 P.2d at 982.
68. Id.
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payments in mind. 69 Thus the court found that the parties must have
intended to include DTP payments as proceeds of the original collat-
eral, and the entire DTP amount was proceeds of the cattle and their
products.
The four dissenting justices, in an opinion by Justice Dore, argued
that finding the DTP payments to be "proceeds" was inconsistent with
UCC § 9-306(1) and with the DTP's purpose, and that the holding
resulted in an unjustified windfall for the creditor bank."° The dissent-
ers pointed out that because the parties' security agreement did not
explicitly mention any government subsidy programs as collateral, the
court should examine the intent of the parties at the time they con-
tracted to determine whether subsidies like the DTP were intended to
be collateral. The dissenting justices found no evidence of such an
intent.7" Thus the UCC statutory definitions did not provide that the
payments were covered by the parties' security agreement, either as
"proceeds" or as original collateral.7"
The dissenters further argued that allowing the bank to have an
interest in the DTP payments would be unfair. First, this result leaves
debtors without the resources to seek new employment, leaving little
incentive for a debtor to stay out of the dairy business.7 3 Second,
unlike the Bachmanns, the bank would not be required to return the
money if the Bachmanns breached, because it would not be bound by
the covenant between the Bachmanns and the government.7 4 Third,
the dissenting justices argued that any losses suffered by the bank
could have been avoided through careful drafting; the bank could have
included "government subsidies," "general intangibles," or "contract
rights" as part of its original collateral.7 5 The dissenters would there-
fore have limited the bank's security to the slaughter value of the
cattle.
69. Id. at 303-04, 757 P.2d at 982 (citing In re Munger, 495 F.2d 511, 513 (9th Cir. 1974)
(parties contract "with an awareness of the importance of ... federal subsidy payments to the
realities of financing a farming operation")).
70. Id. at 308, 757 P.2d at 985 (Dore, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 310, 757 P.2d at 986.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 314, 757 P.2d at 988.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 314-15, 757 P.2d at 988.
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III. "WHATEVER IS RECEIVED": EVALUATING
COLLATERAL, ITS DISPOSITION, AND
PROCEEDS
The facts of Bachmann presented the court with a difficult problem
under the UCC. Because the disposition of the cattle netted their
slaughter value and triggered payment of the subsidy, there were two
amounts that might be claimed as proceeds of the cattle. These facts
required the court to answer questions related to the meaning and the
limits of section 9-306(1). First, what was the collateral? Second, was
there a "disposition" of this collateral? Finally, if the collateral was
"disposed of," what was received upon this "disposition" and are
there limits to "whatever is received"?
In Bachmann, the majority misconstrued the breadth of the parties'
security agreement, which led to a grant of proceeds exceeding Rainier
Bank's security interest. It is true that "disposition" is broadly con-
strued, and that after a disposition of collateral occurs, proceeds can
be received from more than one source. 76 The amount claimed as pro-
ceeds, however, must be related to the collateral described in the
security agreement which is actually "disposed of," even in cases
involving multiple sources of proceeds.77 The bank's security interest
in the proceeds of its collateral should have been limited to the sum of
the slaughter value of the cattle at auction and the portion of the DTP
payments which bring the total proceeds to the market value of the
Bachmanns' dairy cattle.
A. The Court's Analysis in Bachmann
1. The Security Agreement at Issue
The court improperly applied UCC § 9-306(1) because it mis-
characterized the collateral described by the language of the security
agreement at issue. Under UCC § 9-203(l)(a), a security agreement
must reasonably identify the collateral.78 The specific language of
Rainier Bank's security agreement with the Bachmanns identified live-
stock, equipment, and farm products as the collateral.79 Of the listed
collateral, the court focused solely on the livestock.8" There was no
76. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
77. See supra notes 13-20 and accompanying text.
78. U.C.C. § 9-203(l)(a) (1987); see id. § 9-110.
79. Bachmann, 11 Wash. 2d at 299-300, 757 P.2d at 980. The security agreement further
designated the herd as collateral by specifically listing the cattle owned by the debtor. Id. at 300,
757 P.2d at 980.
80. Id. at 301, 757 P.2d at 981. Although the DTP contract also requires that farmers not
sell their milk production facilities for the five years of the contract, these facilities are defined by
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hint that the parties intended "livestock" to mean anything more than
its common meaning."'
The court viewed "livestock" as the equivalent of the Bachmanns'
business. The value of their business, however, included items of per-
sonal property not described by the language of the bank's security
agreement.8 2 For example, the business's value may be enhanced by
its "goodwill,"8 3 and its rights to performance of a contract other than
accounts by another party. These items are included as "general
intangibles" in Article 9. s4 Rainier Bank did not list general
intangibles in its security agreement, either by using Article 9's terms
or by any other language. Therefore, the security agreement did not
identify a security interest in the Bachmanns' dairy business. It only
indicated that the livestock and other tangible items would be encum-
bered. There was no need to go beyond the language of the security
agreement to characterize the collateral.8 5
the DTP regulations to include only the buildings used to produce milk, 7 C.F.R. § 1430.452(bb)
(1988), not equipment, which was also described by the security agreement at issue.
81. See In re California Pump & Mfg. Co., 588 F.2d 717, 719 (9th Cir. 1978) (where parties
sign "a clear and unambiguous designation of personal property... this court will not alter the
clear language the parties employ"); Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank of
Pipestove, 307 Minn. 20, 238 N.W.2d 612, 614-15 (1976) (the security agreement expresses the
agreement between the parties and its language should be interpreted in accordance with its
normal meaning, because of the notice function a security agreement may serve to other
creditors); see also J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 22-4, at 973-81
(3d ed. 1988). White and Summers advocate a two-step process when inquiring whether an item
is proceeds. If the language used "could conceivably encompass the claimed property," then the
court may properly consider whether the parties in fact intended an item as collateral. Id. at 974
(emphasis in original).
82. See U.C.C. § 9-106 (1987).
83. Id. official comment (1972); defined in Glosband v. Watts Detective Agency, Inc., 21
Bankr. 963, 975 (D. Mass. 1981) (goodwill is " 'all that goes with a business in excess of its mere
capital and physical value, such as . . . intangible elements which contribute to a successful
commercial venture' "); accord Bank of Washington v. Burgraff, 38 Wash. App. 492, 499, 687
P.2d 236, 240 (1984).
84. U.C.C. § 9-106 (1987)
85. Although U.C.C. § 1-201(3) (1987) defines "agreement" as the bargain of the parties in
fact as found in language or by implication from other circumstances, most courts have required
either ambiguity in the words of a security agreement or language referring to outside
information before considering evidence outside the security agreement. Annotation, Sufficiency
of Description of Collateral in Security Agreements Under UCC §§ 9-110 and 9-203, 100
A.L.R.3D 940, 962-68 (1980); e.g., In re Amex-Protein Dev. Corp., 504 F.2d 1056, 1060-61 (9th
Cir. 1974) (reference in the language of security agreement); United States v. Mid-States Sales
Co., 336 F.Supp. 1099, 1102 (D. Neb. 1971) (ambiguity); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Hill, 13
Mass. App. Ct. 514, 434 N.E.2d 1029, 1032, appeal denied, 386 Mass. 1104, 440 N.E.2d 1177
(1982) (reference in the language of security agreement); see WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 62A.9-
110 Washington comments (1966) (" 'The description of property in a chattel mortgage must
point out the subject matter covered by the mortgage so that, from the description and such
inquiry as the instrument suggests, purchasers may be able to identify the property intended to be
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2. Analysis of the Parties' Intent
Despite the plainness of the security agreement at issue, the court
went beyond its language and analyzed the "factual context" of the
security agreement. The rationale for the court's characterization of
the collateral in Bachmann was that the parties intended "livestock"
to mean more than just cattle.86 The court found that the bank's mul-
tiple security agreements with the Bachmanns expressed an intent to
encumber a herd that represented a continuing, repetitive income
flow," the proceeds of which were DTP payments. However, examin-
ing the collateral and the circumstances of the agreement from the
perspective of the parties at the time of contracting, the court incor-
rectly held that the parties contracted to encumber more than just the
market value of the cattle.
First, the dairy farming context of the security agreement provided
no clear evidence that the DTP payments were to be proceeds of the
collateral. The court concluded that. because the agreement was
drafted in the agricultural arena, and government subsidies are preva-
lent in agriculture, the parties must have intended that all subsidies be
"proceeds."88 However, it is equally, if not more, likely that if the
parties truly intended to include government subsidies as collateral,
they would have said so explicitly in the security agreement. 9
Second, the realities of personal property security suggest that the
proceeds of the cattle offered as security did not exceed the market
value of the cattle. The parties knew when they contracted that if
something happened to the bank's collateral to cause the end of the
Bachmanns' business, the bank would not have been able to claim the
business' repetitive income flow as its security. For example, the
Bachmanns could have chosen to sell their cattle in a move to another
business or occupation. The Bachmanns could have filed for a Chap-
ter 7 bankruptcy liquidation. Most likely, they could have simply
defaulted on their loan. All of these possible events were foreseeable
when the parties composed their agreements. In each of these cases,
the bank's security would have been limited to the market value of the
mortgaged.'" (emphasis added) (quoting Robson v. Maloney, 42 Wash. 2d 874, 876, 259 P.2d
836, 837 (1953))).
86. Rainier Nat'l Bank v. Bachmann, 111 Wash. 2d 298, 302, 757 P.2d 979, 981-82.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 303-04, 757 P.2d at 982 (citing In re Munger, 495 F.2d 511, 513 (9th Cir. 1974)).
89. In re Schmaling, 783 F.2d 680, 684 (7th Cir. 1986); In re Binning, 45 Bankr. 9, 12-13
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1984).
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dairy cattle.90 Similar risks exist for financiers of any business, and
these lenders likewise can only count upon the market value of their
debtors' personal property as "proceeds."
Third, the UCC structure, which allows other lenders to safely pre-
dict which collateral is encumbered, makes it unlikely that the parties
intended their described collateral to be so broad as to encompass the
entire DTP payment as proceeds. For example, before the decision in
Bachmann, secured party A could have entered into a security agree-
ment with a debtor, claiming a security interest in livestock. Secured
party B, seeing only the cattle (and their proceeds) as collateral in A's
security agreement, could have claimed a security interest in every-
thing else the farmer owned, including general intangibles, accounts,
and other assets of the debtor's ongoing business.9 Before Bachmann,
secured party B would have assumed these creditors could coexist.
Under the holding in Bachmann, the result would be a priority clash
not anticipated at the time of contracting. 92
3. The Policies of the UCC and the DTP
The court improperly weighed the policies of the UCC and the
DTP. These policies indicate that DTP payments are not the proceeds
of "livestock."
The policy of the UCC of uniformity among jurisdictions93 would
have been better served by a different result in Bachmann. By basing
the outcome of the case on the "factual context" of the security agree-
90. Upon default, creditors have the choice of (1) taking the collateral, selling it, and
imposing on the debtor liability for any deficiency, U.C.C. § 9-504 (1987); (2) "strictly
foreclosing" by taking the collateral as satisfaction for the loan with no right to any deficiency,
id. § 9-505(2); or (3) obtaining a judgment and execution on the debt, id. § 9-501(1). The
security agreement at issue in Bachmann also covered equipment, and if it were sold or
destroyed, the bank would be entitled to its proceeds as well.
91. See, e.g., In re Grunzke, 68 Bankr. 446, 447-48 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987). In Grunzke, the
creditor drafted a security agreement encompassing virtually all personal property attendant to a
dairy operation, including equipment, farm products, and livestock, "GENERAL
INTANGIBLES," and "ACCOUNTS, CONTRACT RIGHTS AND OTHER RIGHTS TO
PAYMENT" (emphasis in original) Included under the latter heading were:
Each and every right of Debtor to the payment of money, whether such right to payment
now exists or hereafter arises ... under any contract or agreement ... together with all
other rights and interests . . . which Debtor may at any time have by law or agreement
against any account debtor or any other obligor obligated to make any such payment ...
Id. at 448.
92. See In re California Pump & Mfg. Co., 588 F.2d 717, 720 (9th Cir. 1978) (to depart from
the collateral described by the parties would thwart the UCC's aim " 'to provide a single and
unified structure within which the immense variety of present day financing transactions can go
forward with less cost and greater certainty.' " (quoting U.C.C. § 9-101 official comment
(1987))).
93. U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(c) (1987).
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ment, and not on the language in the security agreement, the court
created the possibility of a less uniform application of section 9-306(1)
to agricultural subsidy and other unusual proceeds cases. The evi-
dence outside the security agreement provided no support for the con-
clusion that the parties intended more than livestock to serve as
collateral, 94 and yet the court used this evidence to support its conclu-
sion. Future cases in Washington and other jurisdictions with similar
facts and the same security agreement language could come out
differently.
This possibility of divergent holdings interferes with the expansion
of commercial lending, another policy of the UCC,95 because the
future effects of a security agreement are not foreseeable by creditors
and debtors. Lack of predictability brought about by a loose construc-
tion of security agreements threatens the extension of credit by lenders
considering loans to debtors who have already granted personal prop-
erty to another party as collateral. The UCC's requirement that the
security agreement reasonably identify the collateral exists for two rea-
sons. First, the section requires that there be sufficient evidence of the
extent of the collateral encumbered by the parties in order to avoid
later disputes.96 Second, the requirement protects subsequent lenders
by offering more detailed evidence of the intent of prior lenders' secur-
ity than a publicly filed financing statement. 97 These potential lenders
will not be able to predict the full extent of the security of prior credi-
tors, such as Rainier Bank in the Bachmann case. The capital needs of
businesses, including farms, may go unmet.
Moreover, the purposes and policies of the DTP do not alter the
effect of section 9-306(1). The purpose of the DTP is to eliminate
farmers from the dairy business98 by giving them the resources to
94. See supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
95. U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(b) (1987).
96. Id. § 9-203 official comment 5.
97. Id. § 9-402 official comment 2 ("Further inquiry from the parties concerned [beyond a
look at the financing statement] will be necessary to disclose the complete state of affairs."); see J.
WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 81, § 22-3, at 966. White and Summers view the security
agreement and its adequate description of collateral as embracing not only a statute of frauds
concern between the two parties to the security agreement, but also the protection of other
lenders. Beyond a look at the publicly filed financing statement when determining which
property of a debtor is unencumbered, "a look at the signed security agreement is a logical
second step." Id. This policy has been articulated in Washington, before and after the
enactment of Article 9. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 62A.9-1 10 Washington comments (1966); see
Shattuck, Secured Transactions (Other Than Real Estate Mortgages)-A Comparison of Article 9
of the Uniform Commercial Code and the Pre-Code Washington Law, in THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE IN WASHINGTON 661 n.36 (1967); see also supra note 85.
98. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
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change occupations.99 Farmers are free, however, to dispose of the
DTP payments as they wish, even by assigning them to other credi-
tors."° No clear policy is therefore articulated by the DTP with
respect to agricultural lending; on the contrary, it appears that the
DTP is not meant to interfere with private contracts. Accordingly,
the secured creditor may claim DTP payments only if the payments
are proceeds of livestock.
B. The Extent of a Creditor's Security Interest Upon Disposition of
the Collateral
1. An Examination of the Parties' Collateral
The first step a court should take in analyzing a proceeds question
like the one presented in Bachmann is to determine the extent of the
creditor's security interest. This must be done by examining the words
used to describe the collateral in the security agreement. Such an
examination of language must take into account the understanding of
the parties to the agreement as well as third parties. If the description
is clear on its face, with no suggestion that more than the stated collat-
eral is encumbered, the court should conclude that the parties
intended only the stated collateral be security for the transaction.
The security agreement at issue in Bachmann indicated that the par-
ties intended "livestock" as their collateral.' Nothing in this security
agreement indicated that more than cattle, as they are commonly
viewed, was meant to act as security."12 There was no need to further
construe "livestock."
After the court determines the extent of the security agreement, it
must determine whether the described collateral was "disposed of."
In Bachmann, the cattle were disposed of when the debtors entered
into the DTP and when they sold the animals. When they entered the
DTP, the Bachmanns caused the value of their cattle to drop in value
from their market value to their slaughter value,'0 3 and this itself was
a disposition. Diminution in the value of a creditor's security interest
may lead to a disposition of that security interest. For example, the
involuntary destruction of collateral results in "proceeds" in insurance
99. Rainier Nat'l Bank v. Bachmann, I11 Wash. 2d 298, 314, 757 P.2d 979, 988 (1988)
(Dore, J., dissenting).
100. 7 C.F.R. § 1430.464 (1988). If the Bachmanns had retained the DTP payments, they
might have gone to other creditors. Bachmann, 11 Wash. at 301, 757 P.2d at 981.
101. Bachmann, 111 Wash. 2d at 299-300, 301, 757 P.2d at 980, 981.
102. See supra, notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
103. In re Bowling, 64 Bankr. 710, 713 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1986).
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cases, 1 4 and action other than transferring collateral to another party
may be a "disposition"' 0 5 with the money received being proceeds. 106
Thus, the security the bank foresaw, the cattle, was disposed of by the
Bachmanns. The question remaining, therefore, is what was received
upon this disposition?
2. "'Disposition" and the Limits of "Whatever is Received"
a. An Amendment to Section 9-306 is Not Appropriate
The limits of "proceeds" should not be defined in the realm of gov-
ernment subsidies through an amendment to section 9-306(1). Inter-
pretive problems concerning whether insurance payments for the
destruction of collateral were proceeds resulted in an amendment of
section 9-306(1) to resolve the issue.107 Drafting a useful amendment
dealing with agricultural subsidies, however, would be a difficult and
unwarranted exercise. Such a statute would be too broad if it included
all subsidy payments, because there are real differences between agri-
cultural subsidy programs and their relation to various types of collat-
eral. The variation between government subsidy programs would also
make an amendment too unwieldy. A statute that attempted to distin-
guish subsidy programs would be long and nearly impossible to draft
because it would have to incorporate the details of current programs
and predict the details of future programs. The question whether
DTP payments are proceeds of livestock is best answered by applying
the current provisions of the UCC.
104. See In re Territo, 32 Bankr. 377, 380-81 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983); Note, Security
Interests in Insurance Payments on Destroyed Collateral as "Proceeds" and Their Priority Under
the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, 45 FORDHAM L. REv. 596, 603, 620 (1976).
105. The maxim of ejusdem generis would require that because "disposition" follows "sale"
and "exchange" in § 9-306(1), its definition must similarly be limited to a transfer of property.
Ejusdem generis counsels that general words following specific ones should be construed to
operate like the specific words. Weisbart & Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of Dalhart, 568 F.2d 391, 395
(5th Cir. 1978); Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. C.I.T. Corp., 679 S.W.2d 140, 143 (Tex. App.
1984). However, the limits of "proceeds" are not satisfactorily defined by this principle. Given
the tendency of many courts to find that the 1972 amendment to § 9-306 merely codified the
UCC's original intent that destruction of collateral be a "disposition" and insurance payments be
proceeds, Ettinger v. Central Pa. Nat'l Bank, 634 F.2d 120, 125 (3d Cir. 1980), "other
disposition" is not always a transfer of property.
106. See In re Hofstee, 88 Bankr. 308, 310 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 1988) (quoting Bowling, 64
Bankr. at 713); Hercules, Inc. v. General Magnetic Tape Co., 180 N.J. Super. 206, 434 A.2d 636,
639 (1981).
107. U.C.C. § 9-306(1) (1987) ("Insurance payable by reason of loss or damage to the
collateral is proceeds, except to the extent that it is payable to a person other than a party to the
security agreement."); see Skilton, The Secured Party's Rights in a Debtor's Insurance Under
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (and Related Matters), 1978 S. ILL. U.L.J. 500,
505-21.
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b. A Quid Pro Quo Approach to Defining "Proceeds"
The most useful approach for determining what is received upon
disposition of collateral in "proceeds" cases is to examine the relation-
ship between the total payment received by the debtor and the value of
the collateral disposed of. Forms of this approach have been applied
in the context of DTP payments,' °8 payments under the PIK pro-
gram, 109 other subsidy payments," and in cases outside the realm of
government subsidies."' Courts should link the value of the collateral
to the "proceeds" claimed in order to ensure that the payment in ques-
tion was received upon the disposition of the collateral, and not from
some other source." 12
In the Bachmann case, this principle would have resulted in only
the portion of the DTP money attributable to the market value of the
Bachmanns' cattle being awarded to the bank. Under this analysis,
the entire DTP amount was not received upon a "disposition" of the
cattle. This result would have achieved a better balancing of the poli-
cies of the UCC and the DTP, while avoiding a windfall to secured
creditors by going beyond the contractual terms of the security
agreement.
The DTP payments included compensation for elements of the
Bachmanns' personal property not covered by their security agree-
ment with Rainier Bank. The payments, determined by farmers' bids,
are based on an entire range of factors other than cattle relating to a
dairy farm. First, the bid amount must take into account future prof-
its that will be forgone by entering the program and leaving ownership
of a dairy business. This prediction takes its shape by considering sev-
108. FMB-First Mich. Bank v. Van Rhee, 681 F. Supp. 1264, 1267 (W.D. Mich. 1987);
Hofstee, 88 Bankr. at 312, 313 (initial decision and addendum).
109. The opinion in In re Judkins, 41 Bankr. 369 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984), is an example of
a quid pro quo approach to proceeds in the PIK program context. In Judkins, the court required
that a creditor prove a "nexus" between the PIK payments and the collateral originally
encumbered by the security agreement. Id. at 373 n.5; cf In re Schmaling, 783 F.2d 680, 683
(7th Cir. 1986) (there must be collateral to dispose of in order for there to be proceeds; thus PIK
payments are not proceeds if crops are not grown).
110. In re Frasch, 53 Bankr. 89, 90 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1985) (Milk Diversion Payments are in
return for a contract to produce less milk, not proceeds of milk produced).
111. Johanson Transp. Serv. v. Jimmy Grizzard Sales, Inc., 164 Cal. App. 3d 583, 210 Cal.
Rptr. 433, 438 (1985); Seaman v. Clearwater Oaks Bank, 469 So.2d 246, 248 (Fla. App. 1985);
C.O. Funk & Son, Inc. v. Sullivan Equip., Inc., 92 Il1. App. 3d 659, 415 N.E.2d 1308, 1315
(1981), aff'd, 89 Ill. 2d 27, 431 N.E.2d 370 (1982); Hercules, Inc. v. General Magnetic Tape Co.,
180 N.J. Super. 206, 434 A.2d 636, 638 (1981).
112. Seaman, 469 So.2d at 248. In Seaman, the court held that the secured party has the
burden of proving that the proceeds claimed arose directly from the sale or disposition of the
collateral and not from any other source. Id. at 247.
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eral factors, such as the individual management success of each
farmer' 13 and the non-cattle elements of the business. Second, the
payments eliminate the risk associated with this predicted profit. For
example, the payments eliminate the possibility of a reduction in prof-
its due to unforeseen cattle disease or destruction of crops used as feed
grain.' Finally, the DTP amount must also be high enough to coax
dairy farmers to leave their chosen profession and seek a new source of
livelihood.
The cattle, the collateral in Bachmann, were disposed of by the
Bachmanns in compliance with the DTP, but only a portion of the
payments received were a product of the disposition of cattle. There
were two elements of the disposition of this collateral. First, the
Bachmanns disposed of the cattle when they sold them for slaughter,
and the auction proceeds were undoubtedly "proceeds" under Article
9. Second, the Bachmanns "disposed of" their cattle when they
entered the DTP and they parted with the value of the herd that could
have been realized on the open market. A quid pro quo approach to
"other disposition" would have granted as proceeds the money
received from the auction of the cattle, and the difference between the
market value of the cattle and their slaughter value at auction. The
total proceeds would therefore equal the market value of the described
collateral.
The UCC policy of expansion of commercial lending, through uni-
formity and predictability, would have been better served by this
result. The court's dependence on the "factual context" of Bachmann
for its conclusion may lead to inconsistent holdings in Washington
and in other jurisdictions. 1 15 In contrast, discerning the parties' intent
by first examining the language in the security agreement would
encourage consistent intent holdings among various jurisdictions.
When the UCC's terms are used without any modification by the par-
ties to a security agreement, the thing claimed as "proceeds" must fit
under its statutory definitions. 16 If parties desire to go beyond the
bare framework of the UCC's definitions, they may expressly modify
113. See 7 C.F.R. § 1430.455(a) (1988) (the contract base may only be calculated based on
quantities of milk marketed for which the contracting dairy farmer shared in the risk of
production).
114. The most prevalent operational structure in dairy farming is the family-oriented farm,
where a large portion of the feed for the cattle is grown on the farm. T. FREY & R. BEHRENS,
LENDING TO AGRICULTURAL ENTERPRISES 263 (1981).
115. See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
116. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 81, § 22-4, at 974. Of course, if the definition of
proceeds is broad enough to cover something, then usually an intent analysis is unnecessary.
Most courts agree. Id. at 978.
Washington Law Review
them."'17 Uniformity among jurisdictions is more likely to be achieved
as terms defined within Article 9 or clearly defined by the parties are
used to express the agreement of the parties. Creditors may more eas-
ily gauge the security they require and other lenders may more easily
coexist when security agreements are interpreted according to their
terms.
IV. CONCLUSION
The court in Bachmann went too far in granting Rainier Bank an
interest in the entire DTP amount, because the language employed by
the parties was not broad enough to encompass more than livestock as
collateral. The DTP payments were based on items of the
Bachmanns' personal property not covered by the language of the par-
ties' security agreement. In order to claim the entire payment, Rainier
Bank should have evidenced in its security agreement an intent to
include more than livestock as collateral.
The cattle encumbered in Bachmann were "disposed of" under
UCC § 9-306, but only so much of the DTP payments as reflected the
value of the collateral was actually proceeds of the cattle. This conclu-
sion results from applying a quid pro quo analysis to determine what is
received upon the disposition of the collateral at issue. In Bachmann,
this analysis would have given Rainier Bank as proceeds the market
value of the cattle. This result would have better achieved the goals of
the UCC of uniformity and the expansion of commercial lending
practices.
Thomas L. Weinberg
117. U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (1987).
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